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Abstract: 
This communication is about the ups and downs of setting up a social protection system in 
Georgia. Whereas in the aftermath of the dismantling of the USSR, a shock therapy was not 
feasible from a political and economic point of view, the Rose Revolution and the perspective 
of Georgia “going West” have given an impetus to social reforms. President Saakashvili’s 
team gives priority to market mechanisms, with state intervention being limited to the poorest 
and old age pensioners, as a simple means of poverty reduction.  
 I argue that Georgia is undergoing an ultra liberal modernisation process, which has 
fostered inequality instead of giving way to decent employment and to redistribution. The 
August 2008 war and the international economic crisis have exacerbated this tendency. 
Whereas the decision makers lack long term perspectives, the social reforms are widely 
determined by the political agenda. Beneficiaries are mostly considered as voters, which is 
detrimental to trust in public institutions and to social cohesion. This opportunistic approach 
does not allow for people’s appropriation of the “new” rules of the game. Therefore, they 
continue mobilising the personal ties which have proved effective in the past. However, the 
personalisation of ties — with petty bribes being widespread — contradicts market economy 
principles, putting at risk the system as a whole. Finally, in the current situation — i.e. strong 
concentration of power, elites disconnected from the people, weak civil society, limited 
freedom of speech, weak external guarantees for government commitments — institutional 
arrangements required for the success of the social reforms risk being hampered, with 
informal and formal rules evolving at increasingly different speeds.  
 The paper is based on published materials, quantitative data and in-depth interviews 
with Georgian and international stakeholders. 
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When asked about their satisfaction with the so-called “transition process”, fifteen years after 
independence, Georgians were very sceptical about the outcome of the economic reforms 
which were being carried out by the national decision makers, with the active support of 
international agencies. They appeared to be even more sceptical than their neighbours in the 
post-Soviet space and were asking especially for more public involvement in health and old 
age pensions (EBERD 2007: 48). Dissatisfaction was particularly widespread among the 
elderly.  
 
This was in 2006, in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution. The perspective of Georgia “going 
West” had given an impetus to a large number of reforms in order to adapt social and 
economic institutions to the standards which were deemed to be those of rich countries. 
Priority was given to market mechanisms which are supposed to bring about growth. Indeed, 
economic growth was close to 10 % and Georgia was considered as a “top reformer” by the 
World Bank rating agency Doing Business.2 The Shevardnadze period, when the country had 
“slithered towards disintegration” seemed far away. By that time, G.W.Bush called Georgia a 
“beacon of liberty”, giving Georgians the fallacious impression that the Rose Revolution had 
been a turning point concerning living conditions, a decisive step towards democratisation in 
the sense of a development process allowing for egalitarian access to wealth… There is little 
evidence that, by 2010, social needs and the people’s aspirations are more actively taken into 
account than before.  
 
This imbalance between positive macro-economic outcome and people’s perception of living 
conditions prompts us to question the threefold challenge post-Soviet countries have had to 
face since their independence: state building, democratisation and the introduction of market 
economy. These three elements of the transformation process are closely linked, but have 
their own logic and temporality and may therefore give way to conflicts (Muskhelishvili 
2008a, Carothers 2002, Diamond 2008, Grosjean and Senik 2007). As far as Georgia is 
concerned, after initial years of democratisation and broad, but nevertheless inconclusive 
market reforms, the Rose Revolution focused on economic liberalisation. However, despite 
overall growth, Mikheïl Saakashvili’s economic course has not given way to poverty 
reduction or to decent employment. On the contrary, the economic reforms have increased 
hardship. Moreover, the August 2008 war has generated new flows of refugees and the spill-
over of the international crisis has exacerbated dissatisfaction with everyday life. The 
international concern for the little country situated on a highly strategic crossroads between 
Central Asia and Europe has even more fostered president Saakashvili’s economic options. 
Nowadays, Georgia has become a beacon of neoliberalism or even libertarianism (ESI 
2010a/b/c), hastening the economic agenda in order to overcome the slow-down in foreign 
investment. Mikheïl Saakashvili considers the liberal economic course as irreversible and 
wants the country to become “like Dubai” in the near future.3 Not surprisingly, market 
principles are also underlying the reforms of social protection. 
 
                                                 
2 For this paragraph, see Doing Business (2006); “Collapse of Georgia is Ignored by the World”, The 
Independent, January 14, 2002 [http://www.counterpunch.org/pcockburngeorgia.html]; “Bush: Georgia 'beacon 
of liberty'”, Cnn.com, May 22, 2005 
[http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/05/10/bush.tuesday/index.html]. All links mentioned in this text 
were accessed in July and August 2010. 
3 See “President Mikheil Saakashvili's Annual Report to Parliament”, February 26, 2010 
[http://www.president.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=231&info_id=2482] ; “Saakashvili : Georgia 
Will be Like Dubai in 5-7 Years”, Civil.ge, June 22, 2010 [http://www.civil.ge/eng/_print.php?id=22438].  
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Considering that social protection is determined by manifold factors — including history, 
economic performance, demography, internal power relations, external pressure, etc. — it will 
be demonstrated that the ideology which is underpinning economic policy is of the utmost 
importance to the setting up and the successful implementation of welfare provision (Cook 
2007, Orenstein 2008, Pierson 2009). To start with, the shift from centrally planned to market 
economy will be illustrated. It has given way to dramatic changes in the field of labour, with 
self-employment being the most common way of making a living in current Georgia, thus 
hampering a salaried labour-centred social protection according to the Bismarckian model. 
The contrast between the Soviet system and current social protection will be worked out 
thereafter, showing that high social demand is only very partially satisfied, whereas market 
mechanisms and individual responsibility are supposed to play a key role. The current system 
appears coherent with authoritarianism benefitting from the weakness of civil society. 
However, national decision makers seem to overestimate people’s readiness to accept the new 
rules of the game.  
1. The painful shift from centrally planned to market economy  
Immediately after the breakdown of the Soviet empire, none of the post-communist countries 
could escape a serious deterioration of social and economic indicators. In Georgia, the 
situation was all the more dramatic as the country also experienced civil war and a threat to its 
territorial integrity. From 2004 on, this situation hastened pro-market reforms and exacerbated 
the authorities’ will to “go West”, to the detriment of well balanced economic structures and a 
dynamic labour market. This approach was also detrimental to the citizen’s expectations for a 
better life and a fairer society based on efficient distributive mechanisms. 
1.1. From the Shevardnadze period to the Rose Revolution  
Prior to independence in 1991, the country’s economy was a relatively flourishing one.4 
Thanks to its tourist potentialities and its cultural resources, Georgia was an attractive place 
not only for the moscovite nomenklatura, but also for the general Soviet public. The primary 
sector provided wine, tea, citrus fruit, etc.; its output represented a third of the country’s 
material production. Over the years, the Georgian economy had turned away from an 
agriculture centred system and fostered industrial production, with new branches (steel, 
aircraft, machine tools, chemicals, energy, etc.) being developed. In 1991, 42 % of the 
national output were related to industry which employed one active person out of five. 
Georgia was also widely involved in the network of inter-republic trade within the USSR. 
This also meant that the country’s production and export capacity heavily relied on energy 
and raw material supply from other republics, usually at lower price levels than international 
ones. At the moment of independence, Georgian agriculture, employing one Georgian out of 
four, provided up to 10 % of the inter-republic food trade, more than 67 % of Georgia’s 
exports went to Russia, 60 % of its imports came from Russia.  
 
However, the principle of inter-republic division of labour and cooperation suddenly vanished 
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, leading to a serious deterioration of the country’s 
international trade activities. Under the new conditions, traditionally exported goods were not 
competitive on markets outside the former USSR, due to a lack of adequate technology, high 
cost of imported inputs, poor infrastructure and inappropriate marketing. Most of the 
industrial capacity became irrelevant to the new challenges the country had to face. The 
                                                 
4 For the data concerning the eighties and nineties, see World Bank (1993), International Center for Human 
Development (Yerevan) / Areat Center (Baku) / Stratégic Research Institute (Tbilisi) (2003). For recent data see 
the National Statistics Office of Georgia: http://www.geostat.ge/. 
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liberalisation of energy prices brought about a very severe terms-of-trade shock. This 
evolution had tremendous consequences in the field of labour. 
 
The Shevardnadze period — 1992 to 2003 — was, to a great extent, characterised by 
economic practices legated from the communist past, with oligarchs and rent-seekers 
managing to optimise their personal benefits and to stop further reforms. Political unrest and 
civil war, dramatic insecurity, ineffectiveness of many core state institutions, including the 
police and the tax authorities, and one of the highest rates of corruption in the world were part 
of everyday life. All these phenomena were the ingredients contributing to the breakdown of 
the Georgian economy. The international financial institutions lost confidence in Georgia’s 
political leaders and in their ability to conduct efficient economic reforms.  
 
The Rose Revolution and Mikheïl Saakashvili’s access to power in 2004 were to put an end to 
this tragic situation. Not surprisingly, the first velvet revolution in the post-Soviet space raised 
many expectations in Georgia as well as abroad, be it among potential investors or 
international donors. Not only did these expectations focus on democratic breakthrough, state 
building and the restoration of Georgian sovereignty over its whole territory, but also on the 
revival of the country’s economy. Concerning the latter, from the very beginning of his 
presidency on, Mikheïl Saakashvili was determined to build up a modern market economy 
with Western standards.5 Whereas Georgians simply hoped for a better life, the international 
community was more ambitious and considered the Rose Revolution as a promise for market 
economy and democracy. Little by little, however, it became clear that market economy and 
democracy building do not automatically go hand in hand, especially if the latter is equated to 
a dynamic process towards a more egalitarian society (Carothers 2009). 
 
One of the most prominent hardliners of the neoliberal reforms was Kakha Bendukidze who 
had made his fortune in Russia in the nineties (ESI 2010a/b/c). Holding important positions in 
Saakashvili’s government — Minister of Economy, State Minister for Reform Coordination 
and Head of the Chancellery — he deeply distrusted bureaucratic decision making, including 
in the European Union. Not surprisingly, the “ideology of [the] reforms was making 
everything private, as much as possible, having small government, as much as possible…”6 
Lado Gurgenidze, Prime Minister, following in Bendukidze’s footsteps, puts it this way: 
“we’re libertarians”, “we do not have any industrial policy of any kind in any sector…”, and 
“we take any legal activity… it does not matter where the growth comes from”.7 
 
The achievements of the reforms should not be underestimated. Indeed, the young president’s 
team succeeded in securing macroeconomic stabilisation by creating market institutions, by 
imposing financial order and by conducting a successful fiscal policy with tax revenues 
making an impressive upward leap. Georgia has the reputation of being one of the most 
investment friendly countries of the world, a global success story of ultra-liberal economic 
governance. 
 
Prior to the August 2008 war and the recent international crisis, the Georgian economy has 
registered high growth rate, ranging from 6 % (2004) to more than 12 % (2007). The decision 
makers’ ability to attract foreign direct investment played a crucial role in this regard. 
                                                 
5 For this paragraph, see Coordonnier (2007), ESI (2010a/b/c), Papava (2009) and Samson (2008).  
6 CATO Institute, ”Georgia’s Transformation into a Modern Market Democracy”, Policy Forum, May 13, 2008 
[http://www.cato.org/event.php?eventid=4646]. 
7 “A Conversation with Lado Gurgenidze, Former Prime Minister of Georgia”, Milken Institute Global 
Conference 2009, April 27-29 [http://www.milkeninstitute.org/]. 
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However, growth was mainly linked to the short-term goals of the restructuring process which 
was meant to adapt the country to a globalised world and to open it to its partners in South 
Caucasus, in the Black Sea Region as well as in the European Union. The focus was on 
developing energy routes, the railway and roads, thus leading to the boom in the construction 
industry. The structural changes also concerned financial intermediation, communication, 
hotels and restaurants as well as trade. These sectors registered an impressive increase, too. 
Conversely, the industrial production decreased, contributing not more than 13,2 % to GDP in 
2009 (GEPLAC 2009), compared to three times as much in Soviet times (World Bank 1993). 
Agriculture did not perform much better and its contribution to GDP was not higher than 
8,3 % in 2009, against 33 % in 1991; value added by the sector was 15 % lower than six years 
earlier. The biggest hurdle in agriculture is the low productivity of the land plots. In many 
cases, their output is insufficient and only provides a subsistence income to their owners. At 
the same time, construction had grown by 62 %, transport and communications by 50 % 
(GEPLAC 2009).  
 
Georgia’s economic profile is quite typical for countries shifting from centrally planned to 
market economy. Economic growth is being driven by market services and construction, 
which is due to high consumer demand and to public actors focussing on the provision of 
public goods in the form of infrastructure and communication. However, in Georgia, the shift 
to market economy has disorganised the labour market to a much greater extent than in other 
post-Soviet countries, a substantial difference worth being highlighted. 
1.2. Self-employment, poor living conditions and high social demand  
It goes without saying that the breakdown of the centrally planned economy has brought 
about profound changes in the field of labour, exposing an unprepared population to the ups 
and downs of the market and fostering social demand for protection against the risks going 
hand in hand with unemployment, bad health, old age, and poverty.  
 
Massive lay-offs during the period following independence completely altered the structure of 
the labour market. Since 1990, the proportion of industrial workers has been divided by four, 
with one active Georgian out of five being employed in industry in 1990, but only one out of 
twenty in 2007.8 More recently, state employment has been reduced drastically, as a 
consequence of the neoliberal approach concerning public administration.9 
 
Agriculture has undergone an adverse evolution. 53 % of all active Georgians live on their 
own home-grown vegetables and fruit, twice as many people as during Soviet times. 
However, they are unable to convert to modern, technology based standards, which is due to 
the overall disarticulation of the production system: 
“ […] There is not much to do in the villages, partly because they do not know how to get the capital for 
seed, fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation maintenant and repairs, farm tools and machinery. Those who can 
raise crops do not know where to sell them. All of these things were provided for them in Soviet 
times. ” 10 
 
The consequences of lay-offs in industry and public administration have not only been 
dampened with workers converting to agriculture. Many jobless have started their own 
                                                 
8 State Department for Statistics of Georgia (1999: 46), Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia (2009a: 
18). 
9 Between 2004 and 2007, the category “Public administration, defence and compulsory social security” 
decreased by 26 %. See Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia (2007a and 2009a).  
10 MacPhee (2005: 144). 
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business in the service sector. This also explains the deep modification concerning the type of 
jobs and the emergence of new social risks. In the centrally planned economy, the labour 
market was relatively homogenous, salaried lifetime jobs were the rule and self-employment 
was practically inexistent. Now the latter is the most widespread way of earning a living: six 
to seven workers out of ten are self-employed. Hired employment only concerns a third of the 
total labour force, with the public sector still being the main employer in the country. The 
Georgian labour market is thus highly segmented.11 Self-employment attains by far the 
highest rate in the post-Soviet space12 and is fulfilling a well known contra-cyclical function, 
as can be observed in poor countries all over the world.  
 
However, the definition of self-employment is questionable, and so is the definition of 
unemployment, officially 16,5 % in 2008. This is five points more than in 2003 (Ministry of 
Economic Development of Georgia 2009a: 9). In reality, self-employment is often equated 
with hidden unemployment, which is particularly the case in agriculture. Indeed, in this 
sector, the status of self-employment is pre-defined, since one hectare of agricultural land in 
the possession of a family means its members are self-employed by definition. Whether one 
hectare of land is enough to earn a minimum subsistence is debatable insofar as the 
productivity of these small-scale farms is so low that in numerous cases their production is 
insufficient to be sold on the market.13  
 
Given the current labour situation in Georgia, no wonder living conditions have dramatically 
worsened since independence, which may give way to nostalgia for Soviet times. In 2007, the 
country’s human development index was still 10 % lower than in 1991. Although there is no 
consensus on the level of poverty in Georgia (UNDP 2008) — which is, among others, due to 
the manifold definitions of poverty and the frequent changes of the national poverty line 
throughout recent history — one Georgian out of three or four can be considered as poor. One 
of the aspects of poverty is the dramatic reduction of food consumption. Since 1990, 
Georgians consume 53 % less meat and fish, 35 % fewer eggs, and 22 % less fruit.14 Another 
indicator of poverty is high health vulnerability. Indeed, infant mortality in Georgia is more 
than three times as high as in Latvia and Lithuania, two countries serving as a model in many 
aspects.15 Moreover, many Georgians forego medical consultations because of financial 
problems.16 Alternatively, whether it is expressed publicly or simply perceived by the 
population, social demand for protection against risks linked to labour market failures, bad 
health, and poverty is high.  
 
Legitimate expectations concerning social protection in Georgia are also high among 
internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to official sources, they were 228,000 in June 
                                                 
11 Insofar, the term of labour market is debatable, which contributes to the difficulty of efficient public policy. 
12 63 % of the Georgian labour force are own-account or family workers, against 57 % in Kazakhstan, 31 % in 
Moldova, 6 % in Russia. See ILO labour statistics [http://laborsta.ilo.org/]. Accordingly, the contribution of the 
“shadow-economy” to GDP is in Georgia one of the highest in the world. See Schneider et al. (2010). However, 
definitions are diverging, which does not allow for exact measurement. According do Georgian statistics, this 
contribution has decreased between 2003 and 2007. See Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia 
(2007b). 
13 See: Forkel (2009), UNDP (2008), and “Rural poverty in Georgia”, on the Rural Poverty Portal, 
[http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/web/guest/country/home/tags/georgia], linked to IFAD (International Fund 
for Agricultural Development). 
14 Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia (2004: 77-78; 2009b: 61).  
15 32 per thousand live births in Georgia, compared to 9 in the Baltics (2006). See the World Health 
Organization website : http://apps.who.int/whosis/database/. 
16 Georgia Primary Health Care Development Project et al. (2007: 12). 
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2009, which is equivalent to 5 % of the country’s population.17 Most of them were displaced 
during the civil war in the nineties, whereas a new wave of IDPs has emerged in the aftermath 
of the August 2008 conflict with Russia. To a great extent, they are accommodated in 
inadequate places, such as former hotels, schools, healthcare facilities, etc. Among them, 
poverty is widespread, health conditions are dramatic and the unemployment rate is two or 
three times as high as among the local population (Zoidze and Djibuti 2004, Transparency 
International Georgia 2009a, World Bank 2009).  
 
As in other countries with similar population structure, demography is undoubtedly one of the 
most important aspects to be taken into account for the successful implementation and 
financial sustainability of social provision. The Georgian society is an ageing one: the median 
age is 38 years, which is close to Western European figures.18 The natural ageing of the 
Georgian society is accelerated by intense out-migration of young demographically dynamic 
generations. Since independence, approximately one million residents — Georgians, but also 
Russian, as well a other ethnicities — have left the country. From a purely technical point of 
view, together with the nature of the Georgian labour market — with only 35 % of the labour 
force being hired and thus supposed to pay taxes — , the demographic structure is a major 
determinant of the social protection model. Indeed, the ratio of 570,000 tax-paying workers to 
860,000 pensioners — among whom 660,000 old age pensioners19 — does not allow for a 
salary-based pay-as-you-go system. As a consequence, other solutions have to be worked out. 
This has been a long process with numerous ups and downs, driven by political internal 
circumstances and external pressure. 
2. Soviet welfare is dead, long live poverty reduction 
The shift to a social welfare system compatible with the market economy is undoubtedly one 
of the most painful aspects of the economic process which post-Soviet countries have been 
undergoing since the beginning of the nineties. In contrast with Eastern European countries, 
where the economic and social context, together with the perspective of EU membership, 
permitted aggressive restructuring in a relatively short period (World Bank 2000), Eurasian 
countries could not engage in immediate radical reforms. They thus became sheer laboratories 
for social protection experiment, giving finally way to divergent models.  
2.1. The Soviet legacy: lifetime security provided by the state  
During Soviet times, guaranteed employment for the working age population and pensions for 
retired workers provided lifetime security to the whole population. Social assistance was 
focussed on those who had special needs such as orphans, the disabled, and families with 
many children (Cook 2007, McAuley 1979, Orenstein 2008, World Bank 2000). Put in 
another way, it was category-targeted. 
 
Full employment — which could go as far as over-staffing, among others in the medical 
sector — was the foundation of the communist welfare state insofar as it gave way to a wide 
payroll-tax base and thus enabled the state to keep the cost of welfare provision low 
(Orenstein 2008). Social provision was not only concerned with universal medical care, old-
age and disability pensions, maternity and family benefits, it also included cheap housing, 
                                                 
17 See the website of Ministry of internally displaced persons from the occupied territories, accommodation and 
refugees [http://www.mra.gov.ge/]. 
18 The median age is 39 years in France, but only 28 in Azerbaijan and 30 in Kazakhstan 
[http://www.indexmundi.com, estimation for 2009].  
19 See the website of the Social Service Agency [http://www.ssa.gov.ge/].  
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subsidized food and energy, education, cultural activities, vacation resorts, etc. The health 
care system was managed by the health ministries and financed from state and enterprise 
budgets. Paid holidays for employees, sick leave, disability pensions, as well as retirement 
pensions for employees were covered by Gosstrakh, the USSR State Insurance Company, 
which ran departments in each Soviet republic depending on a centralised budget. Trade 
Unions and state-owned enterprises were part of the welfare system and as such also played a 
vital role, because the market could not guarantee access to certain goods and services. The 
strength of the Soviet system was undoubtedly due to the broad public health measures and to 
the provision of a basic standard of living for all. It was a comprehensive system which was 
far more generous than protection mechanisms in non-communist countries with an 
equivalent level of development. Social indicators were similar if not better than in Western 
Europe.  
 
However, the Soviet system is nowadays often overestimated and its defenders seem to 
overlook its numerous drawbacks (Cook 2007, Rose 2006). Indeed, health coverage was 
underdeveloped in rural areas, living condition in retirement homes and orphanages were 
appalling, and corruption was widespread. Although the health care system was efficient in 
administering broad public health measures, it was unable to modernize and to provide more 
sophisticated measures required for complex diseases. It goes without saying that the Soviet 
welfare state also had a highly political function. Indeed, although welfare provision was 
supposed to favour equality among workers, benefits were in fact stratified (McAuley 1979: 
88-98). In this way, opponents could be punished, whereas “meritorious” citizens were given 
rewards in the form of better services. The communist welfare state was part of a social 
contract intended to secure people’s acquiescence to authoritarianism, a “finely tuned 
mechanism for differential distribution” (Orenstein 2008: 83). Therefore, it was of vital 
interest to create personal ties with decision makers, medical staff, teachers, etc. which 
compensated for the shortcomings of the system.  
 
As far as Georgia is concerned, all these well-known “shadow-economy” practices which 
circumvented the constraints of the Soviet system were particularly widespread.20 Personal 
networks are by nature strong in this country and they were systematically activated in order 
not only to benefit from amenities such as holidays, but also to facilitate access to fruit and 
vegetables grown on family owned plots. This may explain the relatively high living standard 
of the Georgian population in Soviet times. 
2.2. New categories of assistance beneficiaries 
Georgians became aware of poverty at the beginning of the nineties. This was during the 
Gamsakhurdia period. From a formal point of view, the country was independent, but the 
regime was lacking legitimacy and had no autonomous budget at its disposal. It was by that 
time that massive lay-offswere launched. Shortages of basic food and electricity were 
common. The population’s bank savings were frozen and not given back to the depositors. 
Financial pyramid schemes contributed to the disaster. Whereas employees received a 
“symbolic”, nominal salary in form of coupons, the 1991 earthquake and civil unrest seriously 
triggered awareness of poverty. Moreover, Russia had seized the Georgian share of 
Gosstrakh’s funds, and according to the so-called zero option of interstate debt restructuring 
with Russia, Tbilisi could not help but give up on recovering the amount at stake, 550 million 
US$, i.e. more than 6 % of the 1991 GDP (Tvalchrelidze 2003). According to World Bank 
                                                 
20 Mars and Altman (1987a and b). Useful insight is also provided by UNDP (2000, Chapter 5) and UNDP 
(2002, Annex 1). 
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estimations, the poverty gap was close to 13,3 % of GDP in 1993, which was three to for 
times as high as two years earlier.21  
 
Needless to say, a profound reform of the entire health system was unavoidable (Chanturidze 
et al. 2009). The Soviet-style health system turned out to be incompatible with the market 
economy. It was overstaffed and the occupancy rate of infrastructures was extremely low. 
Besides, during the immediate post-independence era, the health system was severely 
damaged by war and the economic collapse, with IDPs being housed in hospitals. Downsizing 
appeared therefore the unique solution.22 These conditions, together with the drastic reduction 
of public revenue, led to the breakdown of the health system. Between 1990 and 1994, real 
per capita public expenditure on health declined from roughly 13 US $ to less than one dollar. 
One of the outcomes was the dramatic deterioration of health status indicators. 
 
Concerning health protection, for several years, the category-targeted Soviet system was 
continued, but little by little it had to take into account new categories of beneficiaries. The 
first step in this direction was the setting up of the Fund for Social Affairs which was 
primarily supposed to shield the victims of the earthquake. When civil war led to thousands 
becoming homeless, its functions were expanded to securing refugees fleeing the conflict 
areas and to distributing new specific allowances. However, the Fund’s resources consisted in 
foreign donations and some government grants, but they were limited.  
 
As unemployment increased dramatically, the Fund for Social Affairs proved unable to assist 
the jobless who had emerged as another new beneficiary category. This situation gave way to 
the creation of the Labour Fund,23 whose task was to disburse unemployment benefits, 
provide in-kind assistance to the jobless and help companies to preserve jobs. Initially, the 
Labour Fund’s main resource was a 3 % tax wage paid by state-owned and private enterprise. 
Unemployment compensations were theoretically generous. Indeed, benefits were due for one 
year, with an average replacement rate of 65 %, a figure as high as in Germany (World Bank 
1993: 74). The Labour Fund’s inflows however decreased rapidly, which was due to under-
reporting of wages, concealment of workers, and contribution evasion. Mismanagement was 
tremendous. Indeed, in 1999 for instance, administrative expenses were as high as the 
subsidies given to the unemployed (UNDP 2000: 39). At the same time, lack of information 
concerning their rights and dramatically decreasing allowances prevented many jobless from 
registering. In 1999, only 3 % of the unemployed had registered.  
 
Reduced tax contribution base, cash shortage as long as Georgia was member of the rouble 
zone,24 the lack of fiscal civility, poor managerial capacity, deficiency of information, etc. 
were also responsible for the shortcomings of the core institution for social protection, 
labelled Unified Pension and Medical Insurance Fund (World Bank 1993: 68). The latter 
administered pensions, family allowances and sick pay and was financed by a 37 percent 
payroll tax paid by both state-owned and private enterprises, plus one percent paid by the 
employees. Considering this rate, it was in line with Western European practices. The Fund’s 
provisions totalled 12 % of GDP in 1991, with pensions running to 90 % of its budget (World 
                                                 
21 The poverty gap corresponds to the amount of income that would be required to bring every poor person 
exactly up to the poverty line, thereby eliminating poverty in the country. For data, see (World Bank (1993: 68). 
22 Hospital beds diminished from 60,000 in 1989 to 18,000 in 2003, physicians from 32,000 to 21,000 during 
the same period. Source: Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia (2004: 76).  
23 Later on, it was transformed into the United Employment Fund. We do not go into detail concerning the 
different denominations and mergers of the welfare institutions. See Chanturidze et al. (2009). 
24 Until 1993. See World Bank (1993: 10-11). 
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Bank 1993: 69).25 Old-age pensions were still differentiated alike in the Soviet period by 
taking into account the salary and the period of contribution. Replacement rates were as high 
as 70%, thus even exceeding Western European figures. This generous system however 
turned out to be unsustainable, because fiscal resources were low — 11 % of GDP in 1992 — 
whereas the primary budget deficit reached a record high of 35 % of GDP. 
 
In 1995/96, the time appeared ripe for abolishing all Soviet laws which were still effective. 
This also meant introducing social health insurance. New welfare institutions were created, 
such as the State Health Fund (later State Medical Insurance Company and State United 
Social Insurance Fund, SUSIF), which pooled employers’ and employees’ contributions and 
central budget transfers. People were no longer entitled to free health care and this rule was 
enacted in the Georgian constitution. Whereas public insurance coverage was limited to the 
so-called basic benefit package, co-payment became more and more usual. Erratic guidelines 
concerning beneficiaries, definition of provided benefits, fees, etc. introduced a series of 
biases which were detrimental to ensuring smooth functioning. Very soon the system’s 
sustainability was in jeopardy, with a vicious circle of over-equipped and over-staffed health 
services, expenditure cuts and chronic under-funding, accumulation of reimbursement arrears 
concerning health facilities, increasing out-of-the-pocket-payments (OPP), insolvent patients, 
lower demand for health care, bad health indicators, etc. High OPPs deserve our special 
interest not only because of their large extent, but also because of a substantial unrecorded 
share.26 Generally speaking, OPPs drastically diminish the demand for health care, making 
down-sizing even more inevitable, in spite of its contradiction with humanitarian and political 
considerations (Rose 2006). In the eyes of the national decision makers and international 
experts, privatisation appeared to be the only way out of this bottleneck (Transparency 
International Georgia 2007). Therefore, after less than a decade’s existence, the social health 
insurance system was abandoned.  
 
The difficulties faced by the pension system during the Shevardnadze period were similar. In 
the middle of the nineties, a flat rate pension system had been introduced. The shift from 
differentiated to flat rate pensions represented a radical change concerning the conception of 
social welfare and, to a certain extent, prefigured later instruments of poverty alleviation. 
Indeed, since that period pensions have progressively become a simple means of poverty 
reduction, and in 2001, the monthly old age pension represented only 14 % of the minimum 
basket of basic goods (Tvalchrelidze 2003: 19). For many years, the pension system, too, had 
to cope with tremendous arrears, but it was politically inevitable to maintain a certain 
standard. 
 
Not surprisingly, after the Rose Revolution, the pension system, too, was concerned with the 
privatisation trend. Pensions being the most powerful driving force for social spending, 
international agencies and numerous experts recommended solutions to the Georgian pension 
debacle. This is why in accordance with its philosophy, the World Bank suggested a three-
pillar system (World Bank 1994, Gugushvili 2009), opening the market for private insurance 
companies. The national decision makers envisaged the introduction of mandatory social and 
old age pensions and a package of bills was drawn up in this sense.27 However, when Mikheïl 
                                                 
25 For the pension reforms, see Gugushvili (2009).  
26 According to Bell et al. (2004 : 111), “it is estimated that almost half of the total revenue from OPPs is 
informally paid”. 
27 Law on Mandatory Social Insurance, Law on Mandatory Insurance Pensions, Law on Introducing 
Individual Registration and Individual Accounts in the System of Mandatory Social Insurance. See GEPLAC 
(2005). 
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Saakashvili came to power, this reform was withdrawn and a less ambitious, but undoubtedly 
more feasible solution was adopted.  
2.3. Poverty-targeted assistance  
The first velvet revolution in the post-Soviet space had led to new donor support. Indeed, the 
international community considered the young Georgian president a precious ally in the fight 
against international terrorism and political and ethnic extremism jeopardizing peace and 
stability in the Europe-Caucasus-Asia corridor. Poverty alleviation was considered as the 
major issue in this combat. What is more, this was also in phase with the Millenium 
Development Goals. The new team’s neoliberal course was presented as a guarantee in this 
regard. Moreover, “going West” — equivalent to closer cooperation with the EU, or even 
access, as well as NATO membership — was a strong motivation for adapting Georgian 
institutions to Western standards, including in the field of welfare.  
 
2005, the year after Saakashvili’s access to power was decisive for the evolution of the social 
protection in Georgia. The social health insurance system which had operated since 1995 was 
abolished and poverty-targeted instruments were called upon to progressively replace the 
existing category-targeted means of social protection. Unemployment allowances were 
abolished, too. Public funding of social provisions was completely revised. High payroll taxes 
and social contributions had fostered employment in the shadow economy. This is why, in a 
first step, personal income tax was transformed into a flat rate tax of 12 %, without any 
income threshold. In 2009, personal income and social taxes were merged into a 20 % income 
tax, which meant it contributed to 25 % of the total tax revenues (GEPLAC 2009: 11).  
 
Although social transfers currently reach roughly six Georgians out of ten, the contrast with 
social protection in the past is noticeable. Indeed, in 2007, 4,1 % of GDP go social transfers 
such as pensions, allowances for IDPs, targeted social assistance for the poor, and subsidized 
energy consumption provided to certain categories of the population (World Bank 2009: 92), 
against in 12 % of GDP 1991 (World Bank 1993: 69). The social protection expenditure is not 
only low compared to the past, but also to that of the EU countries because the latter spend 
usually more than 20 % of their GDP on such programmes. Consequently and as far as health 
care in Georgia is concerned, out-of-the-pocket payments represent the highest percentage out 
of the 53 European region countries, 71 % in 2007.28 At the same time, private insurances 
have not yet met considerable success. Indeed, less than 2 % of total expenditure on health is 
linked to voluntary health insurance (Chanturidze et al. 2009: 39). 
 
It comes as no surprise that given Georgia’s demography, pensions still represent the bulk of 
the total social transfers. The flat rate pension system has been maintained; the mean pension 
is 80 GEL (33 €) in 2010, which corresponds to 15 % of the average wage.29 Expenditure for 
pensions make up for roughly 3 % of GDP. Georgia’s pensions/GDP ratio is thus one of the 
lowest in Europe and Central Asia. It is also worth mentioning that records on former 
contributions to the social protection system have been abolished, which makes it technically 
impossible to come back to a differentiated pension system (Gugushvili 2009: 380). Besides 
pensions, the second category-based transfer concerns IDPs, irrespective of their well-being. 
Furthermore, some categories of the population, such as WWII veterans and the disabled are 
                                                 
28 See Chanturidze et al. (2009: 39). Out-of-pocket payments correspond to 16 % of total health expenditure in 
EU-15 (Western Europe), 27 % in EU-12 (Eastern Europe) and 37 % in CIS countries (World Bank 2009: 101). 
29 See the website of the Social Service Agency [http://ssa.gov.ge/index.php?id=37&lang=2°].  
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granted monthly housing allowances (44 GEL maximum, which is 18 €). A punctual cash 
allowance of 600 GEL (247 €) is offered for maternity leave.  
 
However, the core instrument of the current social protection is a proxy means-tested data 
bank operated by the Social Service Agency. Every household is entitled to registration and 
according to their living conditions, different benefits are granted, including cash allowances 
and health insurance giving access to the so-called Medical Assistance Programme (MAP). 
By April 2010, four Georgians out of ten were registered in this data bank, two were 
beneficiaries of the MAP. In addition, one got a cash allowance, a mean amount of 27 GEL 
(11 €) per month. It clearly appears that low living conditions are particularly experienced by 
people living in small households, especially if they are over 65.  
 
The current Georgian social allowance distribution, linked to the new data bank, appears to be 
strongly pro-poor insofar as it diminishes the poverty incidence of the beneficiaries from 
71 % to 51 %.30 However, although the World Bank argues that the Georgian data bank gives 
way to one of the “best-performing similar programs in the world”,31 there are numerous 
shortcomings. It is well-known that, compared to other countries, the high out-of-the-pocket-
payments significantly foster poverty in Georgia, but the MAP’s pro-poor impact is limited. 
This is due to the fact that pharmaceutical drugs, which contribute to a substantial part to out-
of-the-pocket payments, are not included in the programme (World Bank 2009: 109-115). 
Given the modest resources allocated to cash allowances, only a third of the extreme poor are 
covered. Generally speaking, cash allowances are not differentiated according to poverty 
depth, which hampers the redistribution effects of the system. What is more, certain points are 
systematically eluded due to their politically explosive nature. What about the pensions and 
especially the old-age pensions in the future? What about the non-poor experiencing hardship, 
but not registered in the data bank? What about the self-employed? Alternatively, the current 
system is all the more perfectible as the needs-driven social assistance is aimed at gradually 
doing away with the communist legacy of category-targeted allowances. 
3. In search of the new rules of the game  
According to the Georgian leaders, the underlying rules of the reforms analysed above are the 
prerequisite for what people simply call a better life, compared to that of Soviet times and the 
first decade following independence. The population’s post-revolutionary enthusiasm 
concerning in-depth reforms has eroded quickly though, as people’s expectations are far from 
being met. The current regime’s “economy first” approach fosters even more neoliberal 
reforms which can only be implemented by increasing authoritarian means, thus leaving 
behind the concerns with a more equal society. In this way, the legacy of the past is 
reinterpreted — by decision makers as well as by the population — in order to implement the 
announced reforms and to render the living conditions more acceptable. 
3.1. Politics matter 
Let us briefly go back to the authorities’ economic ideology. There is evidence that the 
current social protections are coherent with the economic policy engaged since the Rose 
Revolution. According to “new public management” methods, neither social protection nor 
health care are supposed to diverge from overall political options: 
“ The new government strongly believed that the overall development directions chosen had to be 
undertaken in all sectors to be consistent with the country’s overall development. Thus, health care 
reform was considered a continuation of changes already undertaken in other sectors as part of the 
                                                 
30 Poverty incidence measures the percentage of families with a p.c. income below the poverty threshold. 
31 Inspite of inclusion errors of 30 %. See World Bank (2009: 97). 
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national development policy, rather than separate or specific reforms, calling for particular planning and 
considering of specific characteristics of health care and health care markets. ”32 
 
One of the major aims of the post-revolutionary transformation process is the downsizing of 
the state. This means implementing deregulation, simplifying procedures, and reducing 
human resources. Concerning welfare, this means limiting the range of social provisions — 
with the Social Service Agency data bank progressively becoming the core instrument  — , 
but also facilitating their calculation — flat rate instead of differentiated allowances adapted 
to the specific needs of the beneficiaries — . From a technical point of view, this system is 
undoubtedly less labour-intensive than the former one and may explain the substantial lay-
offs in the Ministry of Labour Health and Social Affairs. The same approach is also adopted 
at the fiscal revenue level. The number of taxes has been reduced and tax rates have been cut, 
which does not only diminish labour-intensity and hopefully combat corruption in the public 
service, but is also supposed to attract foreign investment. In other words, the motto is “not 
funding the institutions, but funding the consumers” and “empowering citizens to exercise 
free choice”.33 In this sense, the new tax code which came into effect in 2005 transformed the 
fiscal landscape. There are only six taxes left and Georgia is one of the countries in the world 
with the lowest tax obligations. Nevertheless, due to a broader tax base and better tax 
administration — or, as some put it, due to “excesses and intimidation of the Financial 
Police” (Transparency International Georgia 2010c: 3) —, fiscal revenues increased 
substantially, from 14 % of GDP in 2003 to 25 % in 2009 (GEPLAC 2009: 11), a rate which 
is however extremely low compared to Western European countries.34 Undoubtedly, from the 
purely mathematical point of view, the authorities’ approach to downsizing the state has 
produced positive results and has contributed to the idea of the Georgian success story. 
However, as far as redistribution of wealth is concerned, the outcome is more than debatable.  
 
The in-depth reforms carried out since the Rose Revolution were generally undertaken in a 
“top-down” manner and external threat is regularly used to justify authoritarianism. Weak 
trade unions, low civil society mobilisation, and strong concentration of power facilitated this 
approach. Let us consider first of all the trade unions. Their current practices are deeply 
rooted in the communist legacy. During Soviet times, rather than being organisations 
supposed to defend the employees’ interests against employers, trade unions were part of the 
social welfare system and controlled by the central state. Their leaders were generally 
members of the Communist Party. Long after the breakdown of the USSR, trade unions’ main 
preoccupation was managing with — or “privatising” — their property. It was only in 2005 
that a major change took place, thanks to a new leadership (Transparency International 
Georgia 2010a). There is undoubtedly higher transparency and accountability to members — 
roughly 42 % of the salaried workers are unionised — and outside observers. Nevertheless, 
“stuck between the need to send out a populist message to boost the unions’ popularity and 
the weight of its own responsibility as a party to (nascent) social dialogue, the union 
leadership sometimes appears to have a split personality” (ibid.: 5). A healthy social dialogue 
seems also difficult because of the “ideological distaste for unions within the government 
which sees them as ‘enemies of economic development’”. Changing mentalities is a long-
drawn process, for union leaders as well as for the population. Considering the latter, distrust 
against trade unions is widespread. Only 25 % of the population have a favourable impression 
                                                 
32 Chanturidze et al. (2009: 86). 
33 “A Conversation with Lado Gurgenidze, Former Prime Minister of Georgia”, Milken Institute Global 
Conference 2009, April 27-29 [http://www.milkeninstitute.org/]. 
34 See “2009 Tax Misery & Reform Index”, Forbes Magazine, April 13, 2009 
[http://www.forbes.com/global/2009/0413/034-tax-misery-reform-index.html]. 
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of the work of trade unions, 34 % an unfavourable one, 41 % have no opinion at all…35 For 
all these reasons, trade unions have only played a very marginal role in the setting up of the 
current social protection. It was only very recently that they have gained better visibility and 
creditworthiness thanks to their efforts to bring the Georgian Labour Code — which was 
elaborated without them being consulted and adopted in 2006 — in line with ILO standards.  
 
The implementation of ultra-liberal reforms is also favoured by the weak representativity of 
civic institutions such as NGOs and the organisational ineffectiveness of the opposition. As in 
other CIS countries, the emergence of a specific NGO sector in Georgia is closely linked to 
the transformation process in the nineties (Muskhelishvili 2008a). As a result of ideological 
globalisation, NGOs claimed to promote inclusive social actions, protect human rights, and 
universal values, in short to be the vanguard of the democratisation process in the post-Soviet 
space, a process which was supposed to be irreversible. Interestingly, this is to a certain 
degree reminiscent of the communist party leadership which, in Soviet times, was also 
considered a vanguard… (Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani 2009: 687). Very soon, tough 
competition between increasingly professional NGOs, backed by the international community 
on the one hand, and local, less competitive grass-root organisations on the other, led to the 
marginalisation of the latter, whereas the former turned increasingly to think tank activities 
and legal drafting. Being increasingly “knowledge-based, exclusive and politically active” 
(ibid.:178), they had turned into a reservoir of qualified, urban labour resource. At the same 
time, less innovative organisations, such as universities, churches, research institutions etc. 
which had actively participated in the perestroika movement were implicitly excluded from 
democracy promotion.36 This situation, together with people’s limited trust in organised 
communities has contributed to the weakening of the NGO sector.37 As far as the emergence 
of a representative and inclusive civil society is concerned, the opposition, which has largely 
given up being represented in parliament does not play a very constructive role either. Mass 
protests are haphazard and not supported by institutionalised networks. They are simply 
“spontaneous and disorganised movements, led by more or less charismatic leaders” 
(Wheatley 2010: 6), lacking powerful links with the international community. 
 
It therefore comes as no surprise that since the Rose Revolution the quality of democracy has 
decreased, especially with regard to equal access to resources. Concentration of power is 
currently stronger than before, and whereas the elites are disconnected from the people, public 
policy is to a large extent designed by foreign experts whose responsibility is not subject to 
the ballot. The concentration of power is a multi-faceted phenomenon in Georgia. Firstly, a 
series of amendments to the constitution were voted, shifting the balance of power from 
parliament towards the president (Bertelsmann 2009, Diamond 2009: 200-202, Khutsishvili 
2009, Lanskoy and Areshidze 2008). In other words, super-presidentialism is the price 
Georgians have to pay for Saakashvili’s state-building programme. Moreover, the ruling 
National Movement is virtually merged with the state, since the state’s symbols are used for 
party’s concern (Muskhelishvili 2008). This also reminds the party-state system of the past. 
Secondly, not surprisingly, the regime is constantly suspected of exercising influence over 
judges, which hampers the independence of the judiciary. Thirdly, independence of the media 
is also at stake. Whereas the TV channel Rustavi 2 plaid a crucial role during the Rose 
                                                 
35 See IRI (2009 : 47). Interestingly, people have a very high opinion of the church (93 % favorable). 
36 See also Katsitadze (2010). 
37 Among the NGOs particulary concerned with IDPs, the poor, and health care consumers, one can mention 
Human Rights [http://www.humanrights.ge/]. 
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Revolution and Imedi was the opposition’s “loudspeaker” until 2007, plurality of the media 
has vanished since then.  
 
As in other post-Soviet countries, the “democratic rollback” (Diamond 2008) in Georgia 
frequently gives way to populist measures which are backed by shock discourses. Mythical 
numbers play a crucial role in these discourses,38 and so do mythical places, for instance when 
president Saakashvili claims that “Switzerland will meet Singapore in Tbilisi”.39 Populist 
attitudes can also be illustrated by several “pension reforms” which simply consisted in 
increasing the monthly pensions, without tackling the problem with all its complexity and 
overall implications. Another series of “reforms” was announced in the “50-day Programme”. 
Impressive initiatives are often taken immediately before elections, from a purely political 
stance rather than to improve the living conditions of the most fragile social strata 
(Transparency International Georgia 2010b). Considering the beneficiaries primarily as voters 
is however detrimental to political participation beyond voting and, more generally speaking, 
to having faith in public institutions. Democracy thus remains shallow. 
3.2. Matching potentially divergent institutions 
Finally, it is also instructive to consider the population’s reaction towards the new rules of the 
game — or institutions in the sense of Douglas North (1990) — going hand in hand with the 
transformation process. Concerning the social sector, these rules can be summed up as 
follows: universal monetarisation, commodification of social services, individualisation of 
decision making, personal responsibility concerning risks. One could imagine that they are 
easy to implement because, on the one hand, changes are vividly clamoured for by the 
population and institutional stakeholders and, on the other, the international agencies have at 
their disposal global models which are supposedly adaptable to various situations. However, 
these new formal rules can give rise to deep anxiety because they might contradict informal 
rules. The latter include norms, conventions, models of behaviour, beliefs and constraints 
which are worked out and accepted by the population, according to social values. They are 
linked to the collective memory and are deep-rooted in long term history. Adapting them to 
the new constellation and making them blend with the formal institutions can provoke 
resistance, especially if decision makers do not succeed in meeting people’s expectations. In 
other words, the successful shift towards post-Sovietism needs institutional arrangements 
which can be accepted by all the stakeholders. This condition is not as yet fulfilled in the case 
of Georgia. 
 
Trust is a crucial element in this context. Indeed, formal institutions are supposed to be a 
source of trust in a country’s organisations and in its decision makers. Their main role is to 
guarantee to the population a certain degree of stability. If one looks at recent Georgia history 
though, quite the contrary can be observed. Since the very first reforms, instability and 
confusion are widespread. This is due to the numerous organisations which are supposed to 
define and manage the social protection system. These organisations — United Social 
Welfare Fund, State Medical Insurance Company, United Fund, United Social Insurance 
Fund (SUSIF), Social Assistance and Employment State Agency (SAESA), etc. — had to 
fulfil various changing functions; their autonomy from the different ministries was 
                                                 
38 “100 hospitals”, “100 new agricultural enterprises”, pensions as high as “100 $”, loan programme for the “100 
best businesses”, etc. See also “Government’s Five-Year Program”, Civil Georgia, January 31, 2008 
[http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17030]; Lashkhi et al. (2008) and the Georgian president’s website 
[http://www.president.gov.ge/, link “speeches”]. 
39 “Georgia : Saakashvili Says Switzerland Will Meet Singapore in Tbilisi”, Georgia News, March 9, 1010 
[http://www.euriasianet.org/print/60058]. 
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insufficient and they usually were short lived. Instability is also linked to hesitations in the 
field of legislation. Let us just remind the bills on mandatory social insurance which were 
adopted at the end of the Shevardnadze era. They have never been implemented, because their 
ambitions were incompatible with the local realities. 
 
The impression of instability may also follow sudden changes concerning technical aspects. 
For instance, the taxation techniques and the collection of social contributions have been 
modified several times during the last fifteen years, especially after a new tax code was 
passed in 2005. Moreover, it happened that public and private services fulfilling comparable 
tasks existed side by side, which also destabilised the population. This was the case when 
microfinance institutions supplied microinsurance at a moment when the central government 
decided to offer free health care services in the form of the Basic Benefit Package. Another 
recent modification concerns the poverty threshold for the Social Service Agency data bank. 
In the future, the households’ assets will continue to be taken into account for assessing 
poverty, conforming to the proxy means testing. Nevertheless, the ownership of some items 
— such as cars — is considered incompatible with poverty allowances. This means that 
poverty assessment will have to be redefined according to somewhat modified criteria, 
probably excluding certain former beneficiaries. 
 
Furthermore, the insurance sector is booming, with about fourteen insurance companies 
operating on the Georgian market and offering a range of packages.40 Some of these 
companies try to attract customers by handing out gifts to new subscribers. This situation in a 
sector with strong potentialities is detrimental to objective product information. It might 
disconcert the public and give way to rivalry affecting the whole insurance industry.  
 
Whereas ad hoc measures are frequent, Georgia is lacking a political long term vision and a 
seriously worked out linkage between public policies and specific social measures. This can 
be demonstrated by the following example. The universal insurance coverage has come into 
sharp focus, but there are no institutions offering training for the middle management of 
insurance companies. This lack echoes the problem of professional training in Georgia, and 
more generally speaking, the politics of education (Muskhelishvili 2007).  
 
It is finally also useful to take into consideration the actors of institutional change and the 
plurality characterising them. International agencies, donors, experts, as well as potential 
investors, the members of civil society and their representatives, they all are stakeholders. 
When promoting the new rules of the game, they first of all pursue their own interests, 
partially or entirely. Whereas the citizens hardly take part in the working out of the new rules, 
power relations favour international agencies, especially the World Bank, USAID, and the 
European Commission. They are global actors insofar as they bring together experts who will 
develop global “best practices” and replicate models in different national states (Orenstein 
2005). While emphasizing formal and operational reforms, these global actors do not 
necessarily have the sufficient in-depth knowledge of the local situation and of people’s 
current practices. In other words, informal rules are frequently neglected and their importance 
is underestimated. This may explain why some reforms turned out they simply did no fit the 
local situation and thus have remained a dead letter.  
 
                                                 
40 See “Newcomer Insurer Sparks Discontent among Rivals”, Georgia Today, n° 495, January 29 – February 4, 
2010; “Insurance Boom in Georgia”, Georgia Today, n° 493, January 15 – 21, 2010 
[http://www.georgiatoday.ge].  
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Approaches do not only differ because actors are transnational or national by origin. Dividing 
lines can also be found between and within the different communities, such as donors, 
national decision makers, private partners and experts, and the civil society. Although every 
entity has its own rationale and its specific “culture”, generation conflicts may foster internal 
tensions. This is due to the professional trajectories of decision makers and executors, their 
compliance with the former system or the neoliberal approach. Many of them consider the 
reforms to be undertaken too rapidly, hindering full comprehension of the innovation process 
(Samson 2008: 70). This has also to do with the generation gap. President Saakashvili’s 
tendency to rely on young graduates contributes to fostering these cleavages. 
 
All these different elements create conflicts between formal and informal, so-called modern 
institutions and those transmitted from the past. What about the population who, as a key 
stakeholder, is supposed to benefit from the reforms and who, in the end, decides if the 
reforms are successful or not? For the vast majority of the Georgian population, the shift to 
market economy and to new protection has brought about institutional changes which are 
difficult to accept. The widespread impression is that the state is not able to assume its 
responsibility, especially in the field of welfare. The deficiencies of the system have thus to 
be overcome by practices which have already proved beneficial in the past. This explains why 
personal ties are (re)activated. Indeed, Georgians favour personal contacts and face-to-face 
communication, be it with the medical staff, civil servants or simply shopkeepers. Despite 
free health care in Soviet times, patients were accustomed to giving gifts to their doctor, in 
cash or in kind, be it for cultural reasons and out of gratitude or because they hoped to get 
better service (Belli et al. 2004, Gotsadze et al. 2005, Allin et al. 2006). This attitude became 
even more widespread after the collapse of the health system in the nineties, when payments 
were the only way of getting access to medication. Nowadays, any doubt about the legitimacy 
of the fees is automatically cut short because of the very personal relationship with the 
medical staff. At the same time, the deep rooted habit of paying for health care hampers the 
successful introduction of health insurance, whether it is cheap or not. Indeed, to many 
Georgians, subscribing to an insurance simply “does not make sense”, because payments are 
part and parcel of informal rules.41 Alternatively, the smooth functioning of market economy 
calls for a neutral relationship between atomised customers and suppliers. This condition 
however is currently not entirely met in the Georgian health sector, which might jeopardize 
the reforms, at least for a certain time. 
 
Conclusion 
Seven years after the Rose Revolution, Georgia seems to stand at a new crossroads. In the 
aftermath of Mikheïl Saakashvili’s access to power, the new regime undertook in-depth 
reforms which led to the country’s reputation of being one of the most investment-friendly 
places in the world. The achievements of these reforms — in terms of GDP growth, setting up 
market institutions, downsizing public administration, privatisation, etc. — should not be 
underestimated. Nevertheless, growth was also fostered by the normal catching up process 
which was — and still is — characteristic for post-Soviet countries. A certain number of these 
reforms turned out to be rather reforms per se than constructive elements of a global and 
long-term vision of the country’s future. The August 2008 war and the international crisis 
have profoundly jeopardised the Georgian economy. They have also revealed the fragility of a 
development process primarily based on foreign investment while neglecting not only the 
economic structures inherited from the Soviet past and the central role of agriculture, but also 
                                                 
41 See “5 GEL Insurance Plans: Expectations and Reality”, Georgia Today, February 20 – 26, 2009 and “The 
New GEL 5 Health Insurance Plan is Now in Effect”, Georgia Today, March 6 – 12, 2009. 
 18 
widespread unemployment, underemployment, and the proliferation of informal jobs. It 
comes therefore as no surprise that poverty and hardship are widespread in post-revolutionary 
Georgia. 
 
As the country’s evolution in the 2000s was considered a success story, international donors 
used to turn a blind eye to the deficiencies of the democratisation process in the sense of 
efficient distribution mechanisms allowing for egalitarian access to wealth. Nevertheless, 
driven by the pressure of the Millenium Development Goals and the New European 
Neighbourhood Policy, social policy became a vital concern for the national decision makers 
and their foreign counterparts. After a period of experimentation, social protection currently 
seems to be heading towards stabilisation. Not surprisingly, social risks and material hardship 
are supposed to be combated essentially by market mechanisms. The population is thus 
incited to subscribe health insurance. Public distribution mechanisms only concern the 
poorest and pensioners. Given Georgia’s demography, old age pensioners represent the vast 
majority of welfare beneficiaries, but their flat rate pension can at best be viewed as an 
instrument of poverty alleviation. In other words, social protection seems to a large extent to 
be linked to better Georgia’s position in international benchmarking. The contrast to the 
Soviet-style social protection is tremendous: extensive protection based on life-time income 
security has given way to poverty-targeted allowances for only a part of those living under the 
poverty threshold. Collective concern with welfare is increasingly supposed to give way to 
individual responsibility. Although the current social protection system is in line with 
neoliberal principles, it has not done away with the Soviet legacy which consists among 
others in circumventing obstacles with informal practices. Therefore personal ties continue to 
be activated in order to overcome dissatisfaction with the new system. This approach however 
may create a conflict with the generalisation of market principles in the highly sensitive field 
of social welfare and foster even more radical reforms.  
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